We present the computational wiretap channel: Alice has some data x and wants to share some computation h(x) with Bob. To do this, she sends f (x), where f is some sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is interested in computing another function g(x). We show that, under some conditions on f and g, this channel can be approximated, from Eve's point of view, to a classic Wyner wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
We present the computational wiretap channel. Alice has some data x and wants to share some computation h(x) with Bob. To do this, she sends f (x), where f is some sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is interested in computing another function g(x). A diagram for this channel is shown in Figure 1a .
The computational wiretap channel is a natural model for various settings. For example, Alice could be a user in a social network sharing articles, pictures or videos she likes with her friend, Bob, and Eve could be the service provider trying to classify some of Alice's personal attributes like her sexual orientation, ethnicity, political views, etc (See [1] ).
Our main result is that, under certain conditions on f and g, the computational wiretap channel can be approximated by a classic wiretap channel [5] , shown in Figure 1b . Our result has two versions, one for real-valued Boolean functions and one for Boolean functions. We state them here informally. Figure 1a , can be approximated by a multiplicative wiretap channel, shown in Figure 2b .
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 rely heavily on a generalization, known as the Basic Invariance Principle [2] , of the Berry-Esseen theorem. To use this result we will need some notation and tools from the field of analysis of Boolean functions, the topic of Section II.
In the remaining sections we consider different classes for the functions f and g. For each class of functions we show a formal equivalence between the computational wiretap channel and the classic wiretap channel, Theorems 6, 7, and 8. These formal equivalences are used to prove our two main results, Theorem 1 in Section IV, and Theorem 2 in Section V.
II. ANALYSIS OF BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section we give the necessary tools for proving Theorems 1 and 2. These theorems rely heavily on what is known as the Basic Invariance Principle [2] , presented in Theorem 5, a generalization of the Berry-Esseen Theorem.
All results in this section, apart from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, are taken from [3] and are included here for the better convenience of the reader.
Analysis of Boolean functions is the study of real-valued Boolean functions f : {−1, 1} n → R using analytical techniques. We begin by looking at the Fourier expansion.
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Example 1. The majority function on 3 bits, denoted by Maj 3 : {−1, 1} 3 → {−1, 1}, outputs the most frequent ±1 bit in the input. It is easy to check that its Fourier expansion is
Our main results will rely on the notion of the influence of a coordinate. This notion was originally introduced in [4] in the context of social choice theory but has found many other uses in combinatorics and computer science.
Notation. We will always write random variables in boldface. Probabilities and expectations will always be with respect to a uniformly random x ∼ {−1, 1} n unless specified otherwise.
Informally, the influence of a coordinate measures how much it influences the value of the function.
The influence can be expressed in terms of the function's Fourier expansion, allowing Definition 1 to be extended to real-valued Boolean functions.
Then,
Proof. Theorem 2.20 in [3] . Another key property which can be expressed in terms of the function's Fourier expansion is the variance.
Proof. Proposition 1.13 in [3] . The basic invariance principle, Theorem 5, gives conditions under which the random variable x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) can be substituted by g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ), where each g i is a standard Gaussian, i.e. a Gaussian with mean 0 and variance 1. We need the following hypothesis on the probability distributions.
The main examples to keep in mind are the uniform ±1 random bit and the standard Gaussian.
We now present the basic invariance principle.
Theorem 5. Let F be a formal n-variate multilinear polynomial of degree at most k ∈ N,
Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) be sequences of independent random variables, each satisfying Hypothesis
Proof. See page 357 in [3] .
Some things to note: • Since the standard Gaussian, g i , satisfies Hypothesis 1, y can be taken equal to g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ). • The function ψ is known as a test function. In applications, the test functions of interest might not be differentiable or bounded by their fourth derivative. However, these can often be approximated by smooth functions which do satisfy the necessary conditions. In Corollary 11.68 of [3] , for example, the smoothness of ψ is substituted by a Lipschitz condition. • The goodness of the approximation depends on the degree, k, of the Fourier expansion of f . This requirement might be loosened by truncating the polynomial to a certain degree. This is done in Corollary 11.69 of [3] . In Theorems 1 and 2 we use the following corollary.
Proof. Corollary 11.67 in [3] .
Example 4. Consider the majority function on 3 bits discussed in Examples 1, 2, and 3. In the terms of Corollary 1 we have k = 3 and = 1/2, so that
We need three lemmas for Theorems 1 and 2.
The first lemma bounds the variance of the difference of two real-valued Boolean functions. Proof. It follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that
Thus,
The second lemma shows that if a variable has low influence on two functions, then it has low influence on their difference. 
Proof.
Inf
S tf (S)ĝ(S) ≤ follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
The third lemma shows that if a variable has low influence on two functions, then it has low influence on their multiplication, but depending on the number of terms in the polynomial. Proof. By definition,
We can write f = x t q f + r f and g = x t q g + r g where q f , r f , q g and r g are polynomials which do not depend on x t . Then,
We will first calculate Inf t [x t q f r g ]. Since f and g have, respectively, l 1 and l 2 terms, there exists S
Therefore,
where the second inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the last one from the fact that The same arguments can be used to show that
Thus, by Lemma 2, Inf t [x t q f r g + x t q g r f ] ≤ 4 l.
III. GENERAL FUNCTIONS
In this section we show a formal equivalence, from Eve's point of view, between the computational wiretap channel, as in Figure 1a , and the classic wiretap channel, as in Figure  1b .
Let X be a set and f : X → Y and g : X → Z be two functions. We assume some probability distribution on X which induces distributions on Y and Z. We denote the corresponding random variables by x, y, and z.
In the computational wiretap channel, shown in Figure  1a , Alice has some data x ∈ X and wants to share some computation h(x) with Bob. To do this, she sends f (x), where f is some sufficient statistic for h. An eavesdropper, Eve, is interested in computing another function g(x).
In general, f is not sufficient for computing g, and therefore Eve will have an estimate g(x) = argmax z∈Z Pr(z = z|y = f (x)).
In the classic wiretap channel, shown in Figure 1b In Theorem 6 we show that, from Eve's point of view, the computational wiretap channel is indistinguishable from a classic wiretap channel. We need the following definition to make the statement precise. and v = f (x) with probability distributions induced by x. Let these define the variables in Figure  1b , the random variable w being immaterial (for definiteness set w = v). Then, in both channels, Eve's input is f (x) = v and her output is g(x) = u.
Theorem 6 shows that although there is no noise in the computational wiretap channel, the function f can be interpreted as a noisy version of g. We now show conditions on f and g under which g can be retreived exactly from f .
To every input f (x) received by Eve, there corresponds an estimate g(x). By defining g : Y → Z as g(f (x)) = g(x) we have the diagram in Figure 3 .
The diagram commutes if and only if the estimate is always correct, i.e. if for every x ∈ X it follows that g(x) = g(x). This occurs, for example, if f is injective. In this case, f has a left inverse f −1 and by taking g = g • f −1 it follows that g(
for every x ∈ X.
X Y Z f g g Fig. 3 : Diagram for the functions f , g, and g.
The following result completely characterizes the commutativity of the diagram. Proof. Suppose that the diagram commutes. Let x, x ∈ X be such that f (x) = f (x ). Then,
For the converse, suppose that f (x) = f (x ) implies that g(x) = g(x ) and let y ∈ Y . The fiber of y by f is the set (f −1 (y) = {x ∈ X : f (x) = y}. It follows from our hypothesis that the image g • f −1 (y) has a single element z ∈ Z. Thus g(y) = z.
Proposition 2 can be restated as follows. 
IV. REAL-VALUED BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
In this section, we show that when the functions f, g : {−1, 1} n → R are real-valued Boolean functions with low influence, the computational wiretap channel, in Figure 1a , can be approximated, from Eve's point of view, to an additive wiretap channel, as in Figure 2a .
We begin by showing a formal equivalence between these two channels, analogous to Theorem 6. The noise, N (x), of the additive wiretap channel, in Theorem 7, depends on the data x and the functions f and g. In the next theorem, we show that if x is a well behaved random variable and f and g are low influence functions, i.e. their values do not depend too much on any coordinate, then N (x) can be approximated by some noise, N (g), which only depends on the functions f and g and is independent of x. Theorem 1. Let x ∼ {−1, 1} n satisfy Hypothesis 1 and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be such that each g i is a standard Gaussian. Let f, g : {−1, 1} n → R be of degree k 1 and k 2 with both Inf t [f ] and Inf t [g] smaller than , for every t ∈ [n], and both Var[f ] and Var[g] smaller than 1/4. Assume ψ : R → R is C 4 with ||ψ || ∞ ≤ C. Then the noise N = f − g satisfies
Proof.
Since Figure  1a where f, g : {1, −1} n → R are such that
x i x i+1 and g(x) = 1 n n i=1
x i .
By Theorem 7, this computational wiretap channel is equivalent, from Eve's point of view, to the additive wiretap channel in Figure 2a with noise N (x) = f (x) − g(x).
This noise depends not only on f and g but also on x. Using Theorem 1 we can approximate this noise by N (g) which is independent of x.
One can check that both Inf t [f ] and Inf t [g] are smaller than 2/n 2 , both V ar[f ] and V ar[g] are smaller than 1/n, and k = 2. Thus,
In this section, we show that when the functions f, g : {−1, 1} n → {−1, 1} are Boolean functions with low influence, the computational wiretap channel, in Figure 1a , can be approximated, from Eve's point of view, to a multiplicative wiretap channel, as in Figure 2b .
We begin by showing a formal equivalence between these two channels, analogous to Theorems 6 and 7.
Theorem 8. Every computational wiretap channel is equivalent, from Eve's point of view, to a multiplicative wiretap channel.
Proof. Consider the computational wiretap channel in Figure  1a . Let u = g(x) and N (x) = f (x)g(x) define the variables in Figure 2b . Then, in both channels, Eve's input is f (x) = u(x)N (x) and her output is g(x) = u.
Remark. The multiplicative wiretap channel in Figure 2a is equivalent to a binary asymmetric channel with probability Pr(N = −1|uN = −1) that a 1 is flipped to a −1 and Pr(N = −1|uN = 1) that a −1 is flipped to a 1.
Analogous to Theorem 7, the noise, N , of the multiplicative wiretap channel, in Theorem 8, depends on the data x and the functions f and g. In the next theorem, we show that if x is a well behaved random variable and f and g are low influence functions, i.e. their values do not depend too much on any coordinate, then N (x) can be approximated by some noise, N (g), which only depends on the functions f and g and is independent of x. Theorem 2. Let x ∼ {−1, 1} n satisfy Hypothesis 1 and g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be such that each g i is a standard Gaussian. Let f, g : {−1, 1} n → {−1, 1} be of degree k 1 with l 1 terms and k 2 with l 2 terms with both Inf t [f ] and Inf t [g] smaller than , for every t ∈ (
Then, by Theorem 8, the computational wiretap is equivalent to the multiplicative wiretap channel in Figure 2b with noise N (x) = f (x)g(x). This is equivalent to the binary asymmetric channel, in this case a Z-channel, in Figure 4 . This noise depends not only on f and g but also on x. Using Theorem 2, we can approximate this noise by N (g) which is independent of x.
One can check that both Inf t [f ] and Inf t [g] are smaller than 1, k = 9 and l = 8. Thus, |E[ψ(N (x))] − E[ψ(N (g))]| < 10 5 C.
